| Venue: | SCOTUS |
| Facts: | Botched armed robbery; a guy is dead. Montejo is arrested, mirandized, and interrogated. He changes his story a few times. There's a hearing in which no bail is set, and the office of the indigent defender is appointed to respresent him. On a field trip to look for the murder weapon, he writes an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim's widow. When they get back, he finally gets to meet with his attorney, who is understandably dismayed. |
| Posture: | Letter of apology is admitted over defense objection. Convicted, sentenced to death. LA SC affirms. |
| Issue: | Can police initiate interrogation of a criminal defendant once counsel has been appointed? |
| Holding: | Yes. Affirmed, in part. |
| Rule: | Courts are not required to presume that a waiver is invalid merely because counsel is appointed; the suspect needs to invoke his rights. |
| Reasoning: | Some states appoint counsel on behalf of the indigent defendant. Some
require the defendant to request counsel. This makes it hard to
tell, from state to state, whether a defendant has asserted his
or her right to counsel.
Clearly you can waive your rights. and just as clearly the state should be able to approach a represented defendant and ask if they'd consent to interrogation (i.e., if they haven't indicated otherwise). A defendant who doesn't want to speak to the police without counsel has only to say so. |
| Dicta: | Stevens, dissenting: there's no basis for concluding that the waiver here was knowing and valid. |