| Venue: | SCOTUS |
| Facts: | Birmingham has a race problem with hiring and promotion of city employees. |
| Posture: | This is really bizarre. Back in 1974 the NAACP, et al. file
class action suits. After trial, but before judgment,
the parties enter consent decrees, aimed at fixing things.
District court provisionally approves the decrees, and
publishes notice of upcoming fairness hearings. At the
hearings, the Firefighters Association appears and
objects.
After the hearing, but before the decrees are approved, the BFA and some members move to intervene on the grounds that the decrees will adversely affect their rights. Denied as untimely, decrees approved. Now some white firefighters, all BFA dudes, file a complaint seeking injunctions agains the enforcement of the decrees. District court denies relief. Next, a new set of white firefighters (Wilks) filed a suit alleging reverse discriminations. Some black individuals (Martin) were allowed to intervene to defend the decrees. Defendants moved to dismiss the reverse discrimination claims as collateral attacks on the consent decrees. District court grants the motion. On appeal, 11th Cir. reverses saying that Wilks can't be bound by a suit to which they weren't a party. Cert granted. |
| Issue: | Should the reverse discrimination suit be barred as an impermissible collateral attack, because Wilks should have intervened in the initial proceedings? |
| Holding: | No. Affirmed. |
| Rule: | There is no duty to intervene-- joinder as a party, not opportunity to intervene, is the way to get subjected to the jurisdiction of a court and bound by a judgment. |
| Reasoning: | A judgment or decree resolves issues among the parties-- it doesn't conclude the rights of strangers. This is pretty basic. |
| Dicta: | Stevens, dissenting: of course a bystander has no right of appeal, no matter how harmful a judgment may be. |