| Venue: | SCOTUS |
| Facts: | Hendricks is a repeat sex offender who hasn't been cured by his time in jail. He readily admits this. He's served 10 years, and is slated for release to a halfway house. Right before he gets out the state files a petition seeking his civil confinement as a sexually violent predator, as defined under KS statute. |
| Posture: | KS SC invalidates the act, saying that the act violated due process by predicating commitment on "abnormality" instead of "illness." Appeal. |
| Issue: | Does the definition of mental abnormality satisfy the requirements of
due process?
Also, does applying the act to Hendricks violate either the double jeopardy or ex post facto prohibitions? |
| Holding: | Yes, and no. |
| Rule: | If confinement takes place subject to proper procedures and evidentiary
standards, the right to freedom from physical restraint is not
absolute.
Commitment under this act doesn't serve the objectives of criminal punishment (retribution and deterrence). |
| Reasoning: | The statute doesn't have a low bar: it requires proof of past sexually
violent behavior and a present material condition that makes the
continuation of that behavior likely. Diagnosis as a pedophile,
which counts as an abnormality, is sufficient.
The act is in the probate code, not the criminal code, and it doesn't seek to punish. There's actually a lot of therapy going on here. If it's non-punitive, there can be no double jeopardy or ex post facto problem. |
| Dicta: | Breyer (dissenting): this inflicts a greater punishment on Hendricks than the law would have, so it is ex post facto. And if they just wanted to help him, why not start sooner than just before his release? |