Court: | Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
Facts: | On December 3, 1982, at Rascal's Bar in Antigo, the defendant (Saturnus) encountered undercover deputy
Kujawa, and a civilian informant, Jane Husnick, who were involved in a drug sting. The latter was acting on
a promise of substantial benefits (lessening of her drunk driving charge, payment of a forfeiture,
and the supply of some spending money) as well as out of concern for the problems caused by the drug
trade.
Witnesses disagree about the extent of the sick-person pressure Husnick repeatedly asked Saturnus for marijuana, and he eventually relented, on the basis of sympathy for a story about Husnick's sick aunt-in-law-to-be (Saturnus and Kusnick had known each other since high school). He sold one ounce of marijuana to Husnick, and declined to participate in subsequent sales. On September 12, 1983, Saturnus was convicted of violating § 161.41(1)(b) and § 161.14(4)(t), and sentenced to 24 months in prison. At trial, his defense was that he had been entrapped; he did not object to the handling of jury instructions at the time, but later appealed the conviction on the theory that inappropriate wording of the jury instructions constituted plain error in the trial proceedings. |
Posture: | Defendant (Saturnus) appealed a decision by the Court of Appeals, which had ruled affirming an appeal of a judgment by the Langlade County circuit court regarding whether the jury intructions regarding entrapment place an undue burden on the defendant to prove that the crime was induced. |
Issue: | Whether or not the instructions given to Wisconsin juries as to finding in favor of a defense based on entrapment place an inappropriate burden on the defendant to prove that the crime was induced by the state. |
Holding: | Affirmed. The instructions to the jury were correct, and in keeping with precedent (Hawthorne), statutory history (§ 939.70), and the larger body of law. It is appropriate for the defendant to bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that inducement occurred. The trial court acted properly, and the prior affirmation was also proper. [Opinion by HEFFERNAN] |
Rule: | The defense of entrapment requires the establishment of two elements:
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Reasoning: | Only if the two components of entrapment are established should the jury find the defendant not guilty by reason of entrapment. The state must prove prior disposition, and only if the state has done so does the defendant need to dispute it by saying that it was the product of inducement. The burden is therefore reasonable. Note the precedent that plays a role in the reasoning: in fact, precedent can BE the reasoning. Likewise legislative history. Or policy. |
Dicta: | Note that entrapment only applies when the elements of the crime have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. If there's no such proof, then entrapment doesn't enter into it. |