Area | Rule | Reason | Cases |
Sentencing |
Any finding of fact increasing the penalty of a crime beyond the
statutory maximum must be either admitted or proven to a jury
beyond reasonable doubt. |
6th Amendment (right to trial by jury), 14th Amendment (due process) |
- Apprendi v. New Jersey: analogous to Mullaney
- Blakely v. Washington: includes
sentences imposed after guilty plea)
- Booker & Fanfan: federal guidelines are advisory
- Kimbrough v. United States: guidelines for crack vs. powder
cocaine are also advisory
|
Sentencing |
The goal is to impose "sufficient, but not greater than necessary"
sentence to accomplish the goals of sentencing:
- Reflecting the seriousness of the offense
- Promoting respect for the law
- Provide just punishment for the offense
- Deter other criminal conduct
- Protect the public from further crimes by the defendant
|
8th Amendment (cruel and unusual) |
- Booker: Consider factors like the nature and circumstances
of the offense, history and characteristics of the
defendant, pertinent statements of sentencing policy,
and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities
- Ewing: Three strikes laws are constitutional (incapacitation
of recidivists is a rational goal)
|
Sentencing |
Review of sentences is deferential and confined to looking for
abuse of discretion. |
Booker (so, 14th Amendment, indirectly) |
- Gall: since guidelines are advisory, the sentencer
has discretion-- an appeals court can't superimpose guidelines
of their own.
- Gallion: the court must explain, by reference to relevant
facts and factors, how the components of the sentence accomplish
the objectives
|
Search and Seizure |
Evidence seized in violation of the 4th Amendment (i.e., without a
warrant or probable cause) is excluded at trial |
Court-created remedy to deter police from lawless conduct (unreasonable
searching). When searches are justified, it is to protect the
officer, and to preserve evidence (in the case of search incident
to arrest). |
- Terry: Checking for weapons is an exception to the
warrant requirement and the probable cause requirement:
you can be frisked even if there is no probable cause
to make an arrest. This is not a search to get evidence; it
is a search to keep the officer safe.
- Minnesota v. Dickerson: If you go beyond what Terry
authorizes, the evidence will be excluded. If you touch
something, and it gives you probable cause (i.e., more
than reasonable suspicion) to think it's a weapon, you can
look at it, otherwise not.
- Michigan v. Long: a frisk can include the grabbable
area of the person's car.
- Fourth Amendment: the warrant requirement.
- Fourteenth Amendment: Due Process clause makes fourth
amendment applicable to the states.
- Davis v. Mississippi and Hayes v. Florida: In
order to take peopl in and and fingerprint them, you need
probable cause. Reasonable suspicion is insufficient.
- Mapp v. Ohio: Quoting Brandeis-- if the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law and
invites anarchy.
- California v. Hodari D.: you are not seized unless
your liberty is constrained.
- Exceptions to the exclusionary rule:
- Good Faith: warrant was improperly issued, but
searchers thought the warrant was valid, and it was reasonable
to think that. Not followed in WI!
- Inevitable Discovery: evidence won't be suppressed
when it can be shown that it would have been discovered without
reference to police error or misconduct.
- Independent Source: if the evidence is also
discovered without reliance on anything impermissible, it
can be admitted.
- Plain View: if officers are legally in a place,
and they inadvertantly discover something that is connected
to specific criminal activity (with probable cause), they can sieze
it. This is different from public view. See
Horton v. California and Texas v. Brown.
- Automobile: automobiles move around, so if you
have probable cause to think there's evidence in there, you
can search it, lest it vanish.
- Inventories: when a car is impoinded, it can
be inventoried, lest property go missing, etc.
- Incident to Arrest: you can search a person,
and the grabbable area, incident to arrest. (Chimel v.
California, United States v. Robinson including
containers in the grabbable area: New York v.
Belton). Also, a protective sweep might be allowed
in some circumstances. (Maryland v. Buie).
- There is NO SUCH THING as search incident to citation
Knowles v. Iowa
|
Search and Seizure |
Just finding stuff discarded by people is not a seizure or a search.
Seizing stuff in public view falls under the Fourth Amendment
if doing so would require entry into a protected area. |
Plain common sense |
- California v. Hodari D.: Property found where it was left
by defendant before defendant was seized.
- Molina v. State: Picking up property discarded in plain
view during chase is neither a seizure nor a search.
- California v. Greenwood: Looking in garbage cans left
outside is permitted.
- Kyllo v. United States: the home is especially intimate,
and a search occurs when a commonly accepted reasonable
expectation of privacy is violated, as with sense-enhancing
technology.
|
Stopping and Questioning |
Police may frisk those whom they stop and question, if they have specific
articulable facts that lead them to infer a person might be armed. |
Safety of the officer |
- Terry: It is not a 4A violation to do this, but it is a
seizure, and the search must be confined to the purpose of checking
for weapons.
- Michigan v. Long: the grabbable area of the car is
fair game for frisking.
|
Stopping and Questioning |
Police may stop and question when they have reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity may be afoot. |
Without this, there really wouldn't be much policing. |
- Terry: If it is reasonable for the police to suspect that
a crime is afoot, they can stop and question. People are
not obliged to answer, however.
- Illinois v. Wardlow: Evasive behavior is grounds for
reasonable suspicion.
- Hiibel v. Nevada: When there's reasonable suspicion, an
officer can stop someone and ask questions.
- Delaware v. Prouse: evidence produced by random stopping
is inadmissible
- U.S. v. Sokolow: merely meeting a drug courier profile
is not sufficient for reasonable suspicion, but it can be
taken into account along with other factors.
- Hiibel v. Nevada, Michigan v. Sitz: Fourth
amendment interests are balanced against the state's
legitimate interest (e.g., efficient law enforcement,
or saving lives stopping drunk driving).
- City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: you can't just set up
a roadblock to sieze people for general law-enforcement
purposes without reasonable suspicion (this is the opposite
of Sitz, where the objective was saving lives).
- Illinois v. Lidster: specific law-enforcement purposes
(i.e., getting information about a particular crime that
has been committed) are a valid justification for checkpoints.
|
Stopping and Questioning |
Whether there was vuluntary consent to a search is to be determined
from the totality of the circumstances. |
Per se rules are not sensitive to individual facts. |
- Florida v. Bostick: Courts must examine the totality
of the circumstances when deciding whether police conduct
made a person feel that he/she was not free to decline
the police request or terminate the encounter.
- United States v. Drayton: Again with the totality:
whether or not you were formally notified of your right
to refuse is but one of the many factors the court
may consider when deciding whether a search was legitimate.
- Scheckloth v Bustamonte: Whether a search was voluntary
or the product of express or implied coercion or duress
is a question of fact to be determined from the totality
of the circumstances.
- Hiibel v. Nevada: The Fourth Amendment protects citizens
against the government's unreasonable acts; here, the requirement
to identify one's self came from state law, and was rationally
related to important state interests.
|
Questioning |
You can't be compelled to incriminate yourself |
Lots of reasons, including the fact that you can be compelled to
confess to things you didn't even do. |
- Hiibel v. Nevada: the Fifth Amendment privileges
only communications that are testimonial, incriminating,
and compelled.
- Miranda v. Arizona: Custodial interrogation requires
procedural safeguards: information of the right to counsel,
the right not to be questioned, and the right to silence.
These rights can only be waived intelligently and explicitly.
Some additional notes:
- Custody must be caused by the police
- A stop does not require warnings
- Voluntary trips to the police station aren't custody
- Volunteered statements don't require warnings
- Interrogation is that which calls for an
incriminating response
- Silence and ambiguous responses make things confusing: i.e.,
may we resume questioning you?
- Statements obtained in violation of Miranda can
be used to impeach the defendant's testimony
- Public safety exception: you can ask people where they
dropped the gun before cautioning them
- Routine booking questions don't count (name, address,
non-incriminating biographical junk like that)
- Legislative attempts to override Miranda have been
struck down.
- If an arrest is illegal, and you've been cautioned,
Fourth Amendment concerns will likely suppress your
confession anyway.
State v. Driver: You can be compelled to take a breathalyzer,
give fingerprints, etc. This is not testimonial evidence.
Brewer v. Williams: You have the right to counsel. They
can't question you without your lawyer if you have indicated
that's what you want.
:
|
Standards of belief |
Different activities require different degrees of certainty |
These are serious matters |
- Reasonable suspicion: required for
stop (and frisk). Cause to suspect that some
criminal activity is afoot, and a need to resolve
the ambiguity. Based on specific articulable
facts.
- Probable cause: required for warrants
and arrest. The belief that a specific person is
committing or has committed a specific crime, or
that evidence could be obtained. The facts giving
rise to probable cause do not themselves have to
be admissible as evidence. Would the facts and
circumstances be sufficient in themselves to
warrant someonw with reasonable caution to believe
that this offence has been or is being committed?
|
Arrest |
Arrest is a seizure (and taking into custody) supported by probable cause |
Fourth Amendment |
- Draper v. United States: the standard for probable cause.
- Illinois v. Gates: hearsay from anonymous informants can
be sufficient to produce probable cause: the totality of
the circumstances.
- Florida v. J.L.: The opposite of Illinois v. Gates...
an anonymous tip is insufficient in this case. However, the
greater the risk, the more likely the tip merits action.
- United States v. Watson: arrest without warrant is permitted
if authorized by statute and supported by probable cause
- Payton v. New York: officers can't enter a home without
consent to make a warrantless arrest.
- State v. Smith: Illegal arrest is not a bar to prosecution
or a defense to conviction. Due process can still be
satisfied. The fruits of illegal arrest may be suppressed
(or maybe not, if the state can prove a confession was
voluntary, e.g.).
- State v. King: Search incident to arrest for a non-criminal
violation is permitted.
- Whren v. United States: pretext arrests are permitted.
- Atwater v. Lago Vista: warrantless arrest is permitted
even for things like misdemeanor seatbelt violations. Probable
cause is the standard for all arrests.
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