| Venue: | SCOTUS |
| Facts: | Anderson is an FBI guy, and he conducted a warrantless search of the Creighton family home, because he mistakenly believed a bad guy was there. |
| Posture: | Suit in MN state court. Anderson removes to federal court, and moves for summary judgment. Granted, before any discovery, because undisputed facts indicated there was probable cause. 8th Cir. Ct. App. reverses, saying the lawfulness of the search depends on disputed facts, and this is such a clearly established right that Anderson doesn't get qualified immunity. |
| Issue: | If it was reasonable for a federal LEO to think that a search complies with 4A, can that LEO be held liable for money damages if it turns out that the search actually doesn't comply with 4A? |
| Holding: | Undecideable on the record thus far-- remanded to determine whether the alleged actions are ones that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful. If so, then dismiss without discovery-- otherwise proceed. |
| Rule: | An official gets qualified immunity based on the objective legal reasonableness of the action taken; the right claimed to have been violated has to be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official could understand whether the action taken would violate it. |
| Reasoning: | Actions for damages are really the only realistic avenue for vindication
of rights when government officials abuse their powers. At the
same time, there are substantial costs associated with these types
of suits.
If you assert rights generally enough, it'll always be possible to find one that is implicated-- this violates the spirit of the objective standard we set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald. We need to strike a balance between the vindication of citizens' rights and the public officials' ability to discharge their duties without fearing every step they take. We need to bear in mind that LEOs will sometimes mistakenly, but still reasonably, conclude that their conduct is lawful. That's not the sort of thing we want to penalize. The relevant question here, really, is whether a reasonable officer could have believed Anderson's search was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information that Anderson possessed. |
| Dicta: | Stevens (dissenting): Probable cause (which limits the exercise of police authority to certain circumstances) is already a form of immunity. 4A is a bedrock principle, and here we're giving officers immunity in at least some cases where it's violated. |