Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida

1996

Venue: SCOTUS
Facts: The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act allows gamining only if there's a valid compact between the state and the tribe. It also imposes a duty on the states to negotiate in good faith, and authorizes suits to compel performance of that duty. There's a procedure that empowers a federal court to order the state to enter the negotiations, if there's no agreement, then there's mediation, and then eventually a decision by the Secretary of the Interior.
Posture: Seminole Tribe sues FL and the FL governor in federal court. State moves to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. District court denies. 11th Cir Ct. App. reverses. Appeal.
Issue: Two:
  1. Does 11A prevent congress from authorizing suits against states by Indian tribes for injunctive relief?
  2. Does Ex Parte Young permit suits against governors for injunctive relief to enforce the bargaining duty?
Holding: Yes and no. Affirmed.
Rule:
  1. 11A restricts Article III judicial power, and Article I can't be used to circumvent that.
  2. When there's a specific congressionally-enacted remedial scheme to enforce a right, you can't use Ex Parte Young to get out of using it.
Reasoning: 11A isn't more than just the text of 11A: it's about the presupposition which it confirms. It exists not just to prevent monetary federal court judgments, but also to avoid subjecting states to the indignity of the coercive process of judicial tribunals. The type of relief, in that sense, is irrelevant to whether the suit can be brought.

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer recognized that 14A expanded federal power over the states, and in particular the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. That case could not mean that the principle behind 11A is limited by antecedent (i.e., previously existing) constitutional provisions (i.e., the Article I power to legislate under the Indian Commerce Clause).

We do have this one pesky precedent (Union Gas) upholding abrogation under the Interstate Commerce Clause. But that has been confusing, and stare decisis isn't an inexorable command-- we're ditching that.
Dicta: Stevens (dissenting): What was the "clear statement rule" for, if not a recognition of the power to abrogate?

Souter (dissenting): 11A didn't change the result of Chisholm, it just eliminated citizen-state diversity jurisdiction with respect to state defendants. 11A means what it says. Even the dissent in Chisholm talks about the Judiciary Act, not Article III-- that means even Justice Iredell thought the court had this power. Hans was a mistake, and we're magnifying it here. Saying that states entered the Union with their sovereignty intact certainly doesn't mean that they are exactly as they would have been had they not joined: one major point of the consitution is to make it clear that the people are the ultimate sovereign. Remember the last time we held common-law doctrine as being above congressional legislative enactments? That was Lochner. Hans is federal common law: congress can replace that with statute.