This means we need to know what:
If it's a private transaction, the seller decides what fair market value is. If the purchaser is the government, the fair market value is decided by the courts.
Now, in classical property, the landowner owns from the ground up to the heavens. But that doesn't mesh well with the use of airplanes. So we have the 1926 Air Commerce Act: the US has complete sovereignty over the airspace. The Interstate Commerce Clause strikes again.
So everybody got a check, right? Because the government was taking their property. There's no doubt that congress had the right to pass the Air Commerce Act, but what they're basically doing is taking some property for public use, and they ought to have to pay just compensation.
But we know this didn't happen. Why not? And this also deepens the mystery of Causby: how can this possibly be a taking if the Air Commerce Act was not?
Used to be if there was no title, there was no taking. But there's also the kind of taking where the property is rendered valueless. And there's the concept of physical invasion: flying over the property.
There was a $2K change in the property value: noises, vibrations, chicken crashing.
If there's a property injury, and you can get a remedy for it, you know you have a property right.
Note that this has to be a takings suit: the government does not consent to be sued in nuisance.
Just Compensation | |
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Pro | Con |
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Then Penn Central.
So here, the plaintiff is saying his property has been rendered valueless.
Scalia talks about an "average reciprocity of advantage:" the state is imposing a restriction (as the developer did in Wollf), and the theory is that there is an overall advantage. But not necessarily to each individual landowner.
The restrictions here are imposed to stop beach erosion. The people who are restricted are also the most likely beneficiaries of it (insofar as they have beachfront property, and it would be nice if it stayed that way).
But Lucas is prevented from developing at all. What he lost was the ability to receive "average reciprocity of advantage." And he wants to extend takings, and there's a good argument for doing so, because this would be a small number of cases, and it's easy to show there was no average reciprocity of advantage-- it's a total taking with respect to him.
The state says this isn't acquiring a public benefit, it's preventing a public harm.
In the lower court, Lucas wins on his total takings argument, but loses on the prevention of harm prong.
Now, in SCOTUS, Scalia points out that ANY regulation could be cast as preventing harm. Preventing nuisance, on the other hand, is OK: we're not going to compensate someone for the loss of a right to do something they had no right to do in the first place.
This could certainly be considered a total taking: all the land, for any use. But not for all time.
So they're going to define "total taking" (i.e., whether or not this amounts to one) with an eye on what just compensation would mean.
So as a property owner, we want to tell the court not only that there won't be an avalanche of new cases, and also that whatever cases there will be are relatively easy to decide. This means we fear the other side's Average Reciprocity of Advantage argument, because that means it will be hard to tell who is a winner and who is a loser-- so we need to deal with the fact that those affected by the moratorium are also the ones who stand to benefit the most. And we also fear the "we're preventing a nuisance" defence (which arises if there's a total takings claim).
Now in Lucas, it would have been sort of hard to claim that there was a nuisance. Not so much here. That makes the result of this case kind of easy to predict.
Now we ask whether we'll get the restriction in three contextxs:
Situation 1 | Situation 2 | |
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Benefit-Cost Analysis | Restriction imposed | No Restriction Imposed |
Majoritarian Bias | Restriction imposed | Restriction imposed |
Minoritarian bias | No trstricto imposed | No restriction imposed |