In Speelman, there's a gift of future profits on My Fair Lady. She's his "private secretary" (Speelman's widow had some harsh words for her in her memoirs: love potions, or some such... very odd). But the court thinks this is OK: you can give these future profits.
So why the disparity?
One thing is that the latter trust is written. And Brainard might have been a tax avoidance ploy. And maybe this is more of a gift than a trust anyway. But the tax ploy is probably the main thing: Brainard is trying to spread his income around to people in lower tax brackets. This was sort of a loophole in those days-- it wasn't really tax evasion, but the courts would still stop it, by coming up with narrowly tailored trust decisions.
But as a general rule, future profits aren't a problem. So when you see a strict trust ruling, be alert to the fact that it might be a tax issue at the core.
Law in action point: things are unpredictable. As a general rule, courts favor families over lovers, but here they do.
Hieble: oral promises run afoul of the statute of frauds. So the son was unjustly enriched here.
Rhodes: you have to come to equity with clean hands. If you've given your house away (to get away from creditors, e.g.), then you've given it away.
Constructive trust is rarely used, rarely successful. In order to get it, you need to be a very sympathetic sort of person. You also see it when one spouse takes marital property to a non-marital property state. See the North Dakota example from week one. Again, that was unjust enrichment.
There's a possible merger argument here. If the person has complete control, there's not really a trust, perhaps. Or, on the other hand, one can argue that it's an attempted testamentary transfer (i.e., an attempted will). So you can say: fine, it's maybe a trust, but it can't transfer property at death.
But the court says that some little interest was indeed transferred to Williams (a very little piece: a foggy, revocable little interest), but nevertheless enough to say that Farkas didn't quite own exactly 100% any more. This is the modern trend in handling trust law. Courts say "what's the problem here? what's wrong with what the person wants to do?" If the answer is just procedural details, the court blows them off. Trusts decisions are results-oriented: you see reasoning that is hazy or magical, in order to produce the right result. Ones that appear like trusts decisions, but are in fact strictly technical, tend to actually be tax decisions.
WI has a statute to rescue situations like this: § 701.07.
Passive trust: a trust where the trustee has no duties. These are prohibited. It doesn't matter, though, unless someone complains, and even then the court is likely to find some duty for the trustee, unless there's some reason it shouldn't (like tax evasion).
So first of all, it might not occur to them not to pay the creditors, even though under WI law, it seems like the creditors don't have a cause of action. Note that § 701.07(3) applies to living trusts.
With respect to the Appendix F trust, there's language that the personal representative is empowered to ask the trustee for money for creditors. So they probably would get paid in that case, or at least they could.
Mandatory vs. Discretionary trusts: can the trustee exercise judgment, or is it fixed by the terms.
This trust is a mandatory income trust. But nonetheless, Ms. via is complaining-- she wants the trustees surcharged (this is the trust version of malpractice). But what is she complaining about? The trustee did pay out the income.
It's a question of investment strategy: there's a distinction between trust administration (management) and distribution (making the payments to the beneficiaries). "Mandatory income" is a distribution instruction: distribute the income to these people via these shares.
So do you invest to maximize income or long-term growth? The trustees managed for income, and perhaps they had a vested interest in doing so (building the Bradley center benefited all the prominent Milwaukee business people who were the trustees).
So there's no fixed rule that says how much of a portfolio should be invested on immediate cash flow (to the detriment of the long term growth), but there's a range of acceptability, and the allegation is that this was outside that range, regardless of the fact that all the beneficiaries got their share of the income.
Administration of a trust involves investment decisions, and those decisions have an impact on the distribution (i.e., the amount of income to be distributed). So the maxim "have mandatory income, and that'll avoid disputes" rings hollow.
This can backfire-- it can interfere with things like tax planning.
If you make it unequivocal that it's intended to supplement state aid, you're probably OK. If the trust becomes irrevocable before that language is added, then you're at the mercy of the decisionmaker's interpretation of the language of the document.
This is a growing area, because more people with disabilities are living longer.
If all beneficiaries (and this includes unborn ones) get together and agree on a change, some courts will allow it. Often these changes are about taxes-- something about the way the trust is set up causes a lot of tax, so the family goes to the court and asks for a reformation to match the presumed intent of the person who set it up.
The language of the trust seems to make one beneficiary the primary concern, but it also seems to assume there are some remaining assets. Which shall it be? Moral: say what you mean, and leave as little room for inference as possible.
So Clause A pretty much just leaves us with reasonableness. She's asking for 7.7% of the value of the trust. Is that a lot, or a little? Depends on the timeframe. In the long run, you might see a 10% return on stocks. You might generally be able to get an 8% ROI. But maybe we're at the beginning of a long bear market, and we'll wind up depleting principal faster than we expect. And also, there's inflation. And we don't know what these assets are: can we get $46K in cash easily?
So the size of the trust is really important, when we're deciding how liberal to be when interpreting that "absolute discretion" clause. Also the makeup of the assets: what if the main asset is real property, and can't be easily subdivided?
Also the history: what was the size of the trust last year? What has the history of her requests been?
A good practice is to make some projections about burn rates and return rates and share those with the beneficiary to work out a plan. Here are the range of consequences.
If the beneficiary is intractable, you can explain your concerns, and reduce the amounts of the distributions (i.e., if they refuse to disclose what other assets they have). You need not to let yourself be manipulated (i.e., "grandpa would have wanted me to have this"). And when you communicate options to the beneficiary, you make a record of it.
Again, so many possible conflicts can be headed off just by being more explicit when drafting your trust.
A beneficiary is entitled to material information about the trust.